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In 2017 the plenary organ of the ICC, the ASP, adopted Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5, activating 
the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression; and confirming an interpretation of the Rome 
Statute. While the characterization of this Resolution as either a subsequent agreement or 
subsequent practice under Article 31(3) VCLT is relevant to treaty interpretation of the Rome 
Statute, this article submits that this Resolution is clearly a Rule of the International Organization, 
taken by one of its organs. Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5 may constitute a ‘relevant rule’ of 
interpretation with regard to the Rome Statute, thereby taking precedence over the general rules 
of interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT; particularly when the interpreter is an organ 
of the ICC. If a dispute arises with regard to the interpretation of the Rome Statute on the crime 




On 14 December 2017, the Assembly of State Parties of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“ASP”) session in New York, adopted by consensus Resolution ICC-ASP/16. 
Res.5 on the 14 December 2017, titled ‘Activation of the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime 
of aggression’ (“New York Activation Decision”). Accordingly, in July 2018, the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) over the crime of aggression was activated.1  Prior to the 
New York Activation Decision, the crime of aggression at the ICC remained dormant, which 
speaks to the significance of this decision by States Parties.2   
                                                
• Lecturer in Law, University of Essex. The author wishes to express gratitude to Christiane Ahlborn, Roger Clark, 
Olufemi Elias, Niccolò Lanzoni, Noam Lubell and Martins Paparinskis for their comments on an earlier draft of this 
article.  
1 Paragraph 2: ‘[d]ecides to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as of 17 July 2018. 
2 The President of the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Christian 
Wenaweser, had reflected, ‘[g]iven the high stakes and the late hour, I put a final proposal on the table, which today 
is the text of paragraph 3 of Articles 15 bis and 15 ter of the Rome Statute: the activation of both triggers is thus subject 
to a future decision of states parties, to be taken after 1 January 2017 by at least an absolute majority of two-thirds of 
states parties’, see Christian Wenaweser, ‘Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression: The Chair’s Perspective’ 
(2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 883, 887. See also Niels M Blokker and Stefan Barriga, ‘Conditions for 
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 In anticipation of future cases on the crime of aggression that may arise at the ICC, two 
concomitant issues need to be addressed. First, the scope of the jurisdiction that the Court may 
exercise over the crime of aggression. In other words, who may be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC for the crime of aggression. The answer lies in the interpretation of the provisions in the 
Rome Statute relevant to the crime of aggression. Yet, questions on interpretation may also be 
disputes with regard to the interpretation of the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime.3 As famously 
defined by the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”), a dispute is ‘a disagreement on 
a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons.’4 This leads to 
the second issue: the dispute settlement mechanisms available to States at the ICC as well as the 
international legal order in the event that a dispute may arise with regard to the Rome Statute on 
the crime of aggression.  
In 1996, when States Parties adopted the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute”), the crime of aggression was stipulated as a crime that the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over,5 but remained undefined. Instead, (now) former Article 5(2) stipulated:     
 
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted 
in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under 
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be 
consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.6 
 
Already at the very early stages of preparatory works on the definition of the crime of 
aggression and the conditions of jurisdiction, there was ambiguity with regard to the amendment 
process. One of the key questions in the preparatory works was how amendments to the Statute 
were to enter into force. Notably Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute, stipulates that the intended 
‘provision’ should be ‘adopted in accordance’ with Article 121, i.e. the provisions in the Rome 
Statute that govern amendments. However, Articles 5(2) and 121 do not appear prima facie 
compatible,7 as the language in the former provision refers to ‘adoption’ of the definition and 
conditions of exercise of jurisdiction over the crime, whilst Article 121 as read in its entirety 
suggests that any amendment ‘adopted’ will ‘enter into force’ pursuant to either Article 121(4) or 
                                                
the Exercise of Jurisdiction Based on Security Council Referrals’ in Claus Kress and Stefan Barriga (eds), Crime of 
Aggression Library: A Commentary, vol 1 (Cambridge University Press 2017) 653. 
3 Henry G Schermers and Niels M Blokker, International Institutional Law (6th edn, Brill: Nijhoff 2018) 871. 
4 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK) PCIJ Rep 1924, Series A, No.22 at 11.  
5 Article 5(1), Rome Statute.  
6 This paragraph was deleted was deleted in accordance with RC/Res.6, annex I, of 11 June 2010.  
7 Roger Clark, ‘Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute’ (2009) 41 Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law 413. 
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(5). As former Article 5(2) neglects to specify an entry into force procedure for the amendments 
to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression, there was an ambiguity with respect to how Article 
121 should be interpreted. In the earlier stages of negotiations, States had contemplated that a 
‘special entry-into-force mechanism’ should be formulated ‘to cut the Gordian Knot’.8 
The ambiguity prevailed throughout the negotiations leading to the Review Conference 
(Article 123 of the Rome Statute) in Kampala in 2010, as well as during the Conference itself. 
Thus, even though States Parties adopted Resolution RC/Res.6 by consensus, which comprised 
amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression (“Kampala Amendments”), how the 
amendments may enter into force remained a contentious issue between scholars and States alike. 
As will be discussed below, this question is premised on whether the amendments on the crime of 
aggression enter into force in accordance with the sui generis amendment process as adopted by 
States Parties in Kampala or with Article 121 of the Rome Statute that governs amendments. It 
may be wondered what the practical significance is for such a technical question of treaty law. The 
answer is that entry into force of the amendments pertains directly to the scope of jurisdiction that 
the Court may exercise over the crime of aggression as it determines who may be subject to the 
Court’s jurisdiction.   
The ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression has been a frequent subject of scholarly 
debate in the seven years after the Review Conference in Kampala, whereby key negotiators and 
scholars wrote extensively on the interpretation of the Kampala Amendments.9 Two prevailing 
positions can be deduced: first, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression so 
long as either the intended aggressed State or alleged aggressor State has ratified the Kampala 
Amendments;10 and alternatively, the Court may not exercise jurisdiction over nationals of States 
Parties that have not ratified the Kampala Amendments – a submission that argues that both 
                                                
8 Claus Kress and Leonie von Holtzendorff, ‘The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression’ (2010) 8 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 1179, 1199. See also Stefan Barriga, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and Christian 
Wenaweser, The Princeton Process on the Crime of Aggression: Materials of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 
2003-2009 (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2010) 51; Astrid Reisinger Coracini, ‘Amended Most Serious Crimes’: A New 
Category of Core Crimes within the Jurisdiction but out of the Reach of the International Criminal Court?’ (2008) 21 
Leiden Journal of International Law 699, 716. For a criticism, see Andreas Zimmermann, ‘Amending the Amendment 
Provisions of the Rome Statute: The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression and the Law of Treaties’ 
(2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 209, 227. 
9 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9); Stefan Barriga and Leena Grover, ‘A Historic Breakthrough on the Crime of 
Aggression’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 517; Stefan Barriga and Niels Blokker, ‘Entry into 
Force and Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction: Cross-Cutting Issues’ in Claus Kress and Stefan Barriga (eds), 
Crime of Aggression Library: A Commentary, vol 1 (Cambridge University Press 2017); Roger Clark, ‘Exercise of 
Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression (International Criminal Court)’ [2019] Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
International Procedural Law. 
10 Stefan Barriga and Niels Blokker, ‘Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction Based on State Referrals and Proprio 
Motu Investigations’ in Stefan Barriga and Claus Kress (eds), Crime of Aggression Library: A Commentary, vol 1 
(Cambridge University Press 2017) 668–672; Meagan Wong, ‘Ratifying the Amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression’ (2016) 19 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
176, 208; Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1212–1215. 
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intended aggressed State and alleged aggressor State must ratify the Amendments.11 These 
scholarly positions were also reflective of the positions of States Parties,12 which culminated in 
general uncertainty with respect to how the amendments would enter into force, and the 
jurisdictional scope of ICC over the crime of aggression. The uncertainty extended to whether the 
ASP in New York would be able to resolve this outstanding issue with a view to activating the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Yet, States Parties appeared to have taken a step 
further than anticipated, as the conflicting positions deliberated in New York culminated in an 
Operative paragraph in the Activation Decision:   
 
Confirms in the case of a State referral or proprio motu investigation the Court shall not 
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when committed by a national or 
on the territory of a State Party that has not ratified or accepted these amendments.  
 
Despite adoption by consensus, this paragraph does not reflect the position of all States 
Parties present at the ASP at New York. Some States Parties had previously expressed their 
preference for a broader jurisdiction of the Court with regard to the crime of aggression.  It may 
appear as if these States Parties have conceded on their original positions on the scope of the 
jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the crime of aggression in light of obtaining a consensus in 
order to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime.13  
Yet, given the lack of clarity with regard to the entry into force of the Kampala amendments, 
it is significant that the ASP confirmed the scope of the jurisdiction of the crime of aggression in 
the New York Activation Decision. The New York Activation Decision serves as a means of treaty 
interpretation in this regard. According to the legal framework of the law of treaties, it is possible 
that the New York Activation Decision may be a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice 
according to Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (“VCLT”). The 
recent work of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) on its Conclusions on subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties (“ILC 
Conclusions”) is particularly insightful in this regard. Yet, another important dimension is that the 
                                                
11 Dapo Akande and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Treaty Law and ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression’ (2018) 
29 European Journal of International Law 939, 955–959; Zimmermann (n 9) 219–220. 
12 Stefan Barriga, ‘The scope of the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression: a different perspective.’ Available 
at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-scope-of-icc-jurisdiction-over-the-crime-of-aggression-a-different-perspective/; 
Dapo Akande, ‘ The ICC Assembly of States Parties prepares to activate the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression: But who will be covered by that jurisdiction?’ Available at:  https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icc-assembly-of-
states-parties-prepares-to-activate-the-iccs-jurisdiction-over-the-crime-of-aggression-but-who-will-be-covered-by-
that-jurisdiction/  
13 Claus Kress, ‘On the Activation of the ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression’ (2018) 16 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1, 13–14. 
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ICC is an international organization, and the Rome Statute, its constituent instrument. The New 
York Activation Decision was adopted by the plenary organ of the ICC, and thus .14 Thus, from 
an international institutional law perspective, the New York Activation Decision may be 
considered as “rules of the organization,” which arguably may take precedence over the general 
rules of interpretation under the Vienna Convention.15 To better understand the New York 
Activation Decision as a means of treaty interpretation, it is thus necessary to consider both law 
of treaties and international institutional law analytical frameworks. As current literature appears 
to have only considered the law of treaties perspective,16 this article fills in the gap by considering 
the international institutional law aspects relevant to the Court as an international organization, 
and the Rome Statute as a constituent instrument.  
Furthermore, the settlement of disputes with regard to questions - or disputes – on the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression has not yet been discussed in 
scholarly literature.  Thus, this article also contributes an additional dimension to the scholarly 
debate by bringing forth dispute settlement perspectives to the activation of the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression at the ICC. 
  In light of the foregoing contributions to scholarly debate, this article is structured as follows.  
First, Section 2 sets out, and elaborates upon, the ambiguity with regard to the entry into force of 
the Kampala Amendments and the implications thereof for the jurisdictional regime of the ICC 
over the crime of aggression in State referrals and proprio motu investigations. As will be illustrated, 
the Rome Statute and the Kampala Amendments comprise different entry into force mechanisms 
respectively, leaving the question of which is the appropriate entry into force mechanism for the 
amendments on the crime of aggression. To shed light on this question, Section 3 discusses the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute in accordance with the rules of interpretation in Articles 31 and 
32 of the VCLT. Within this framework, the New York Activation Decision is characterized as a 
subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a) to confirm the meaning of the Rome Statute in 
accordance with Article 31(1). In the event that an interpreter may not be convinced that the New 
York Activation Decision amounts to a subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a), it may be 
considered as subsequent practice in accordance with Article 32 as a supplementary means of 
                                                
14 Article 112, Rome Statute.  
15 Draft Conclusion 12, paragraph 4, ILC Conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation 
to the interpretation of treaties, see Commentary to Draft Conclusion 12, paragraph 4, at p.104, para.40.   
16  Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12); Andreas Zimmermann, ‘A Victory for International Rule of Law? Or: All’s 
Well That Ends Well?: The 2017 ASP Decision to Amend the Kampala Amendment on the Crime of Aggression’ 
(2018) 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice 19; Darin Clearwater, ‘When (and How) Will the Crime of  
Aggression Amendments Enter into Force? Interpreting the Rome Statute by Recognizing Participation in the 
Adoption of the Crime of Aggression Resolutions as “Subsequent Practice” under the VCLT’ (2018) 16 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 31.     
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interpretation. Yet, another important aspect is also highlighted, which is that the New York 
Activation Decision is a Rule of the International Organization. Accordingly, it may prevail over 
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT with regard to the interpretation of the Rome Statute. As questions 
of interpretation are disputes about the interpretation, section 4, considers the procedural aspects 
of dispute settlement pursuant to the Rome Statute, as well as the international legal order more 
generally.  
The main submission of this article is that the New York Activation Decision confirms the 
amendment process pursuant to Article 121 of the Rome Statute for the entry-into-force of the 
Kampala Amendments, which in turn has the juridical effect that only nationals of States Parties 
that have ratified the amendments may be prosecuted at the ICC in State referrals and proprio motu 
investigations. In the event that one or more States Parties may disagree with the judicial function 
of the ICC in this regard, or with the interpretation or application of the Rome Statute, Article 119 
provides a dispute settlement mechanism. Accordingly, it would appear that States Parties have 
somewhat more freedom of choice as to the means of settlement with respect to disputes other 
than the judicial function of the ICC.  
The contributions of this article are threefold. First, by characterizing the New York 
Activation Decision as a subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT, the legal effect 
of the interpretation espoused with regard to Article 121(5) may be considered as an authentic 
means of interpretation of the Rome Statute pursuant to Article 31(1). In the particular context 
when the interpreter is an organ of the ICC, the New York Activation Decision is a “Rule of the 
International Organization”, which means that the paragraph that relates to the interpretation of 
the Rome Statute may constitute a “relevant rule” of interpretation. This has practical significance 
as the Court may only exercise jurisdiction over nationals that have ratified the Kampala 
Amendments in the absence of a Security Council referral. Secondly, this article has engaged with 
the recent work of the ILC in its Conclusions on Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice, 
while also drawing to light the particular aspects of Constituent instruments. The New York 
Activation Decision, thus serves as a very relevant and apposite study for the law of treaties and 
international institutional law. The significance of the activation of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression thus extends beyond international criminal law. In a similar vein, and thirdly; 
the discussion of specialist and generalist dispute settlement regimes with regard to the ICC is a 
topic which expands also beyond the crime of aggression.17    
                                                
17 Letter dated 9 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the UN addressed to the SG, ‘Request for 
an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the consequences of legal obligations of States under 
different sources of international law with respect to immunities of Heads of State and Government and other senior 
officials’ (18 July 2018) UN Doc A/73/144.   
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2. The Rome Statute and the Kampala Amendments:  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the entry into force of the Kampala Amendments is directly 
relevant to the jurisdictional scope of the ICC over the crime of aggression. Yet, the ambiguity is 
premised on the entry into force mechanism – as will be demonstrated below, the Kampala 
Amendments appear to purport a different entry into force mechanism than the Rome Statute. 
Also, as will be demonstrated, State consent is inextricably linked to the entry-into-force 
mechanism of the Kampala Amendments, which in turn, has an effect on the jurisdictional regime 
of the Court over the crime of aggression. Thus, whether the Court may exercise jurisdiction over 
a national of a State Party for the crime of aggression is premised upon the way by which the 
Kampala Amendments have entered into force.  
First, it is worth outlining the jurisdictional regime pursuant to Articles 15 bis and 15 ter of the 
Rome Statute, followed by examining the entry into force of these provisions.  
 
2.1. Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression   
 
In Kampala, two issues that remained unsolved from the prior negotiations formed the crux 
of the negotiations: first, the role of the UN Security Council as a pre-jurisdictional filter to 
determine the existence of an act of aggression prior to the commencement of an investigation or 
proceedings at the ICC; second, whether State consent of the alleged aggressor State is required in 
the event of proprio motu investigations and State referrals.18 Both issues pertained to the conditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction, which led to a series of compromises between States Parties in this 
regard. The definition of the crime, which was formulated successfully in the preparatory work 
prior to Kampala, made its way without further discussion at the Review Conference into Article 
8 bis.19 The conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction of the crime, on the other hand, involved 
reaching a consensus in relation to the two unresolved issues of State consent and the role of the 
Security Council. Ultimately, the compromise between States Parties resulted in two different 
                                                
18 Wenaweser (n 3) 884; Niels Blokker and Claus Kress, ‘A Consensus Agreement on the Crime of Aggression: 
Impressions from Kampala’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 889, 889–90; Barriga and Grover (n 10) 
520. 
19 Barriga and Grover (n 10) 521–523. 
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jurisdictional regimes pursuant to the trigger mechanism:20 Article 15 bis (State referrals and proprio 
motu investigations); Article 15 ter (Security Council referrals).21  
Article 15 ter is considerably more straightforward than Article 15 bis, stipulating inter alia that 
the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression can be triggered if the Security Council refers 
a situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.22  
By contrast, there are three key aspects to Articles 15 bis. First, Article 15 bis comprises a 
specific institutional regime: when the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, there is first the need to ascertain 
whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the 
State concerned. 23The Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of 
aggression where the Security Council has made such a determination;24 yet, where no 
determination is made by the Council within six months after the date of notification, the Pre-
Trial Division may authorize the commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of 
aggression, enabling the Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation in respect of this crime.25  
Notably, this is a departure from the draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 
prepared by the ILC in 1994,26 as well as the positions of the UK and France who had argued for 
the Security Council to serve as the exclusive jurisdiction filter for the crime of aggression.27 Thus, 
the issue of State consent of the alleged aggressor State for jurisdiction became a key point of 
principle,28 adding further complexity to the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction and an 
already ambiguous entry-into-force mechanism of the Amendments.  
                                                
20 Article 13 of Rome Statute concerns the ‘trigger’ of the Court’s jurisdiction: (a) [a] situation in which one or more 
of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party; (b) A situation in which 
one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in 
respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15; See further William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 2016) 371–379.; see also Roger O’Keefe, International Criminal 
Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 535–536. 
21 Barriga and Grover (n 10) 528–529. 
22 Article 15 ter(1), Rome Statute.  
23 Article 15bis (6), Rome Statute.; the provision also stipulated: The Prosecutor shall notify the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations of the situation before the Court, including any relevant information and documents.     
24 Article 15 bis(7), Rome Statute.; Note that a determination of an act of aggression by the Security Council for the 
purposes of Article 15 bis is not substantively binding on the ICC as Articles 15 bis(9) and 15 ter(4) stipulate that: ‘a 
determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own 
findings under this Statute.’ For a criticism of this, see Alain Pellet, ‘Response to Koh and Buchwald’s Article: Don 
Quixote and Sancho Panza Tilt at Windmills’ (2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 557, 563.     
25 Article 15 bis(8), Rome Statute.  
26 Article 23(2) reads ‘A complaint of or directly related to an act of aggression may not be brought under this Statute 
unless the Security Council has first determined that a State has committed the act of aggression which is the subject 
of the complaint’.; see further, ILC Commentary at 39.; See also Niels Blokker, ‘The Crime of Aggression and the 
United Nations Security Council’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 867, 870–874. 
27 ibid 878; Blokker and Kress (n 19) 894; Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1212. For a background on the varying 
positions in the SWGCA, see Blokker (n 27) 876–878. 
28 Wenaweser (n 3) 884–885. 
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Pursuant to Article 15 ter (1), it will suffice for the Security Council to refer a situation to the 
ICC. Thus, the institutional regime requiring a determination of an act of aggression as a 
jurisdictional filter prior to the initiation of investigations is only applicable to State referrals and 
proprio motu investigations.   
Secondly, Article 15 bis(5) stipulates: ‘in respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, 
the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that 
State’s nationals or on its territory.’ By contrast, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression pursuant to Security Council referrals, ‘irrespective if whether the State concerned 
has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in this regard.’29 Thus, non-States Parties are entirely excluded 
from the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression in the absence of a Security Council 
referral.30  
Notably, this departs from the jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the other crimes in Article 
5(1) of the Rome Statute as Article 12(2)(b) stipulates that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction 
over a national of non-State Party if the crime was committed on the territory of a State that has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.31 It can be inferred that this decision was made on the 
premise of upholding State consent.32   
Thirdly, Article 15 bis(4) stipulates:   
 
The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression, 
arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has 
previously declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the 
Registrar. The withdrawal of such a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be 
considered by the State Party within three years. 
 
The reference to Article 12 merits further consideration. Article 12(1) of the Rome Statute 
stipulates that a State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the 
Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5 (which includes the crime of aggression). 
                                                
29 Understanding 2 in Annex III of Resolution Res RC/Res.6.  
30 Japan has said criticized Article 15 bis as ‘an amendment which unjustifiably solidifies blanket and automatic 
impunity of nationals of non-State Parties: a clear departure from the basic tenet of article 12 of the Statute; see 
Statement by Japan; Statements by States Parties in explanation of position before the adoption of resolution 
RC/Res.6, on the crime of aggression, contained in Annex VII, Review-Conference-official-records, RC/11; The 
position of Japan has also been addressed in Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1212; Zimmermann (n 9) 221–223.  
31 Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and 
Limits’ (2003) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 618, 626. 
32 The President of the Review Conference has reflected that the exclusion of non-States Parties altogether, together 
with a possibility for States Parties to opt-out of the Court’s jurisdiction had emerged as a compromise to the issue of 
state consent, and acknowledges the ‘wholesale exemption for non-states parties’, as a significant compromise, see 
Wenaweser (n 3) 885, 887.. 
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Article 12(2) suggests that jurisdiction rationae materiae over the crime is premised on either the 
nationality or territoriality principle of jurisdiction of a State that has accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Yet, the explicit reference in Article 15 bis(4) to ‘State Party’ implies that the Court 
cannot exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression arising from an act of aggression committed 
by a non-State Party. This is further affirmed by the next provision, which as mentioned above, 
excludes non-State Parties entirely from the jurisdiction of the Court on either the nationality or 
territoriality principle. Thus, to uphold the nationality or territoriality principle inherent within 
Article 12(2), it is suggested that pursuant to Article 15 bis(4) a national of a non-ratifying State 
Party can be prosecuted for the crime of aggression arising from an act of aggression against a 
ratifying State Party; or a national of a ratifying State Party can be prosecuted for the crime of 
aggression arising from an act of aggression against a non-ratifying State Party.  
Notably, Article 15 bis(4) provides an opt-out declaration for States Parties who do not accept 
the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The negotiation history suggests that the opt-
out declaration was created to reconcile the positions of States who wished to apply the existing 
jurisdictional regime under Article 12 to the crime of aggression and those in favor of a strict 
consent-based regime for jurisdiction.33 This feature of Article 15 bis(4) suggests that the 
jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression in the case of State referrals and proprio motu 
investigations is premised on a tacit consent/opt-out regime. Accordingly, it is presumed that State 
Parties have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in the absence of a 
Security Council referral so long as they have not opted-out.    
The opt-out declaration in Article 15 bis(4) is central to the debate with regard to how State 
consent to jurisdiction should be demonstrated: whether consent needs to be express, i.e. in the 
form of a ratification of the Kampala Amendments; or whether consent is implied unless the State 
Party has ‘opted-out’ of the Court’s jurisdiction over this crime. The latter suggests a tacit consent 
by States Parties of the Court’s jurisdiction of the crime.  
 
2.2. The entry into force of the Kampala Amendments   
 
The ASP had stipulated that the Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with Article 
121(5).34 According to Article 121(5): 
                                                
33 Kress and von Holtzendorff reflect that ‘to not require the ratification of the alleged aggressor State Party, but to 
grant that state the right to opt out, amounts to a ‘softened consent-based regime’ that is situated somewhere between 
the two poles and is, therefore, a suitable basis from which to reach a compromise. Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 
1213.    
34 Operative paragraph 1, Resolution RC/Res.6; For a background on the negotiations for entry-into-force, see Barriga 
and Grover (n 10) 523–525. 
 11 
  
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those 
States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted 
the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by 
the amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory.  
 
In the preparatory work of the Kampala Amendments,  Article 121(5) was subject to two 
different understandings by States Parties: i) a negative interpretation; ii) a positive interpretation.35 
The former reads Article 121(5) in its entirety with the effect that jurisdictional regime over the 
crime of aggression will not apply towards a national, or territory, of a State Party that has not 
ratified the amendments, whilst the latter reads the second sentence of Article 121(5) in the context 
of the entirety of the Rome Statute in a manner that limits its effect on the existing jurisdictional 
regime.36 In light of the positive interpretation, a non-ratifying State Party attains the same position 
as a non-State Party with respect to Article 12(2) of the Rome Statute, whereby the Court may 
exercise jurisdiction provided it is satisfied of a nationality or territoriality principle.37 
With regard to the Kampala Amendments, two interpretations largely based on the 
aforementioned interpretations have been put forward with respect to how Article 15 bis(4) should 
be read in light of Article 121(5).   
One interpretation is premised on the demarcation of Article 121(5). The first sentence: ‘any 
amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties 
which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification 
or acceptance’ is read in isolation from the second sentence, and serves as the entry into force 
mechanism for the Kampala Amendments.38 Blokker and Barriga have suggested that Article 12(1) 
serves as the lex specialis, as it refers specifically to States Parties accepting the Court’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression, while the second sentence of Article 121(5) does not specifically refer 
to the crime of aggression, but relates more generally to amendments to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8.39  By 
considering Article 12(1) as the lex specialis, Article 15 bis(4) which refers to Article 12 would thus 
prevail over the second sentence of Article 121(5) with respect to the jurisdictional regime over 
                                                
35 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1196–1198; Zimmermann (n 9) 217–220. 
36 Reisinger Coracini (n 9) 705-713,718; Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1197–1198. 
37 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1197–1198; Reisinger Coracini (n 9) 711–713. See also Alain Pellet, ‘Entry into 
Force and Amendment of the Statute’ in Antonio Cassesse, Paola Gaeta and John RW. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002) 182. 
38 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1214; Barriga and Blokker (n 10) 627–628. 
39 Barriga and Blokker (n 11) 666–667. For a criticism of this position see Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 957.; 
For a different view on the lex specialis, see Zimmermann (n 9) 212.  
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the crime of aggression. Thus, so long as one State Party has ratified the Kampala Amendments, 
the Court may apply jurisdiction over the crime pursuant to the territoriality or nationality 
principles of jurisdiction with the caveat that the alleged aggressor State Party has not opted-out 
of jurisdiction.40     
The alternative interpretation upholds that Article 121 is the lex specialis;41 and Article 121(5) 
is applicable in its entirety.42 Thus, the Kampala Amendments enter into force for States Parties 
according to the first sentence of Article 121(5), while the jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
is governed by the second sentence: ‘in respect of a State Party which has not accepted the 
amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the 
amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory.’ The ordinary 
meaning of the second sentence suggests that the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction if both the 
intended victim State Party and alleged aggressor State Party have ratified the Kampala 
Amendments.43 Thus, contrary to the view above, this jurisdictional regime appears to be an ‘opt-
in’ regime, as opposed to a tacit consent/opt-out regime.44 States Parties nevertheless are not 
precluded from opting-out from the Court’s jurisdiction over this crime, even if they do not ratify 
the Amendments.45    
 The underlying question is whether the jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the crime of 
aggression in the absence of a Security Council is premised on Article 15 bis(4) or Article 121(5). 
Although this may appear to be a highly technical question of law of treaties, there is also a practical  
element whereby the first position would espouse a broader scope of jurisdiction (“broader 
position”), while the second position gives rise to a narrower scope of jurisdiction (“narrower 
position”).  
Thus, either position has a practical effect with regard to the powers of the ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Put simply, the broader position suggests that the ICC 
may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression if either the aggressed State or the aggressor 
State have ratified the Kampala amendments; and the latter has not opted out.46 The narrower 
position stipulates that the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction if both aggressed and aggressor 
States have ratified the amendments; and the latter has not opted out.47   
                                                
40 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1214. 
41 Zimmermann (n 9) 212. See also Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 952. 
42 Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 957. 
43Zimmermann suggests that ‘only on the basis of Article 121(5) ICC Statute in its ‘negative understanding’ 
interpretation that any amendment to the Statute providing for the crime of aggression could be adopted and 
eventually enter into force’, Zimmermann (n 9) 219–220. 
44 For a criticism of this view, see Barriga and Blokker (n 11) 663. 
45 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1213. 
46 See Table 6.2, Wong (n 11) 208.  
47 See Table 6.1, ibid 204. 
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To shed light on which position comprises the better interpretation, it is necessary to consider 
the amendment process of the Kampala Amendments. The starting point is Article 121 of the 
Rome Statute, which governs amendments. As discussed above, paragraphs (4) and (5) are relevant 
to the entry into force for amendments and were considered in the course of negotiations with the 
latter ultimately chosen. Article 121(5) in its entirety, if read in accordance with Article 121 as the 
ordinary amendment process, would appear consistent with the narrower position. The broader 
position, on the other hand, demarcates Article 121(5) with the effect of applying only the first 
sentence exclusively to the entry into force of the amendments, and departs from Article 121 in 
its entirety. This creates a sui generis amendment to the Rome Statute. The question thus arises 
whether the amendment process of the Kampala Amendments stems from the ordinary 
amendment process as adopted in Rome or the sui generis amendment process as adopted in 
Kampala. This shifts the present inquiry to ascertain whether the ASP had the powers to adopt 
the Kampala Amendments under a sui generis amendment process.        
  
2.3. The powers of the ASP in Kampala to amend the Rome Statute  
 
From an international institutional law standpoint, the ASP have the power to amend the 
Rome Statute on the crime of aggression, particularly with regard to the definition and the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction as mandated by former Article 5(2). As discussed above, 
the question of whether the broader position or narrower position should prevail is premised on 
the amendment process of the Rome Statute and how the Kampala Amendments should enter 
into force. The issue that merits further consideration is whether the powers of the ASP to amend 
the Statute is limited to the amendment process pursuant to Article 121, or if States Parties may 
amend the amendment process, and thus the Rome Statute, by mutual agreement.48   
Resolution RC/Res.6 as adopted by consensus in Kampala, stipulated that the amendments 
shall enter into force in accordance with Article 121(5); while the narrower position in relation to 
the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is premised on the application of Article 
121(5) in its entirety. Thus, the question is not whether States Parties have departed from the 
amendment process as stipulated in the Rome Statute, but rather whether Article 121(5) itself can 
be amended. There are two possibilities in light of the latter: either a provision in the Rome Statute 
allows this; or States Parties have tacitly agreed to amend Article 121(5). Both possibilities are now 
examined. 
                                                
48 Schermers and Blokker (n 4) 767. See also Zimmermann (n 9) 211. 
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Article 121 is the only provision in the Rome Statute governing amendments.49 In assessing 
whether the Rome Statute stipulates otherwise, the obvious port of call is to return to former 
Article 5(2). The text of former Article 5(2) does not mention an amendment process specific to 
the crime of aggression, but refers to Article 121 in its entirety. Yet, former Article 5(2) expressly 
provides the ASP with the mandate to define the crime and set out the conditions under which 
the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. The question is whether this 
mandate also provides States with the power to create an amendment process that they deem fit 
for the purposes of adopting the definition and conditions of the crime.    
Two views may prevail. First, and the more restrictive view, purports that the powers 
conferred by former Article 5(2) are limited to the definition and conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction as there is no mention of a special amendment procedure for the Kampala 
Amendments.50 The specific reference to Article 121 is used in further support of this view. Yet, 
as discussed above, the specific reference in former Article 5(2) to Article 121 raised ambiguity in 
the course of the preparatory work and negotiations and propelled States to consider a special 
entry-into-force mechanism as a practical solution in light of two seemingly incompatible 
provisions.51 Thus, the second view suggests that a sui generis amendment process was necessary 
for the ASP to carry out the function of adopting amendments that define the crime and the  
conditions under which the Court may exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, the mandate in former 
Article 5(2) was broad enough to provide the ASP with all the powers it deemed necessary to 
negotiate and adopt amendments on ‘all aspects’ relevant to the definition of the crime of 
aggression and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction,52 with the only caveat that the 
amendments are to be consistent with the UN Charter. This would thus comprise the powers to 
create a sui generis amendment process to give effect to the definition of the crime or conditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction.  
Even if it is not entirely clear whether former Article 5(2) provided the ASP with the powers 
to create a sui generis amendment process, the view that States Parties may tacitly amend a treaty is 
generally accepted,53 e.g. Frowein takes the position that ‘all the parties to a treaty, by unanimous 
decision, can override all limitations contained in specific treaty provisions,’ 54 and it is ‘theoretically 
                                                
49 Zimmermann (n 17) 212. 
50 Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 951. 
51 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 9) 1199; Barriga, Danspeckgruber and Wenaweser (n 9) 51; Reisinger Coracini (n 9) 
716. But see Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 951. 
52 Barriga and Blokker (n 11) 668. 
53 Commentary to Draft Conclusion 11(2), ILC Conclusions p.84, para.8. 
54 Jochen A Frowein, ‘Are There Limits to the Amendment Procedures in Treaties Constituting International 
Organisations?’, Liber Amicorum: Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern in honour of his 80th birthday (Kluwer Law International 
1998) 204. 
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possible to argue that states, under those circumstances would at the same time tacitly amend the 
rules concerning the amendment procedure.’55 It is arguable that the ASP had tacitly amended the 
amendment process in Article 121.56 
Although States Parties did not clearly or expressly indicate any intention to amend Article 
121, a closer look at Articles 15 bis and 15 ter suggest a departure from the amendment provisions 
in the Rome Statute including Article 121(5).57 Articles 15 bis(2) and 15 ter(2) stipulate the quorum 
of thirty States Parties to accept or ratify the Amendments, while Articles 15 bis(3) and 15 ter(3) 
which require an activation decision to be taken after 1 January by the same majority of States 
Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment. It may indeed appear that the effect of 
these common articles are that the amendments on the crime of aggression enter into force for 
each ratifying State Party individually before the amendments enter into force for the Court.58 This 
would suggest that entry into force is entirely separate from the activation of the Court’s exercise 
of jurisdiction.59  
 Both aforementioned common articles as conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction depart 
from the amendment process of the Rome Statute, as Article 121 does not mention a quorum of 
the acceptance or ratification by 30 States Parties or an additional activation decision subject to 
the same majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment. Yet, this 
‘formula for delayed activation’ was devised by the President of the Review Conference as a means 
to obtain a consensus,60 as part of the powers conferred to the ASP by former Article 5(2) to adopt 
amendments on the definition of the crime of aggression and conditions under which the Court 
may exercise over this crime.  
Thus, States Parties had relied on these powers to create conditions for the exercise of the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the crime are not entirely consistent with Article 121 of the Rome 
Statute.61 It can be inferred that a sui generis amendment process must be in place in order to give 
effect to these conditions. The argument can be made that States Parties tacitly agreed to amend 
the amendment process to enable delaying the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression as one of the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. This would mean that Article 
                                                
55 ibid. 
56 But see Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 953. 
57 Zimmermann (n 9) 220. 
58 These States Parties have ratified the Kampala Amendments before the Activation Decision : Andorra; Argentina; 
Austria; Belgium; Botswana; Chile; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; El Savador; Estonia; Finland; 
Georgia; Germany; Iceland; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands Panama; Poland; 
Portugal; Samoa; San Marino, Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; State of Palestine; Switzerland; The former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia; Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay; Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-b&chapter=18&lang=en.  
59 Barriga and Blokker (n 10) 627–628. 
60 Wenaweser (n 3) 887. 
61 But see, Zimmermann (n 9) 227. 
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121 was not complied with in its entirety. Accordingly, it not entirely persuasive to suggest that 
Article 121(5) must apply in its entirety for the purposes of consistency with the provision in the 
Rome Statute governing amendments. If States Parties have tacitly amended the Rome Statute to 
allow a delay in the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction as a condition for the exercise of 
jurisdiction as mandated by former Article 5(2), then a reading of Article 121(5) that disregards the 
effect of the second sentence on the consequences on jurisdiction pursuant to the entry-into-force 
is tenable on the basis that the amendment process of the Kampala Amendments has departed 
from Article 121 in its entirety.   
It is perhaps worth clarifying that both divergent positions with respect to how Article 15 
bis(4) should be read in light of Article 121(5) uphold consent of the alleged aggressor State. The 
issue is the manner in which consent is expressed. The broader position is premised on a tacit 
consent/opt-out framework, whereby States Parties to the Rome Statute have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression,62 unless they opt-out pursuant to Article 15 
bis(4). The narrower position holds that consent is expressed by way of a formal ratification, and 
refer to Article 40(4) of the VCLT: ‘[t]he amending agreement does not bind any State already a 
party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending agreement.’ Yet, the VCLT is 
subsidiary to the Rome Statute in the particular context of consent,63 as it is for States Parties to 
decide on the mode of expressing consent.64 Thus, if States Parties wish to create a tacit 
consent/opt-out framework, this is entirely within their powers and discretion. For the foregoing 
reasons, whichever jurisdictional position ultimately prevails, State consent is upheld.  
 
3.  Interpreting the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression  
 
3.1. The ICC and Kompetenz-Kompetenz   
 
The principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz applies to the ICC, as stipulated in Article 19(1) of the 
Rome Statute: ‘[t]he Court shall satisfy that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before 
it.’65Accordingly, the ICC also has the inherent jurisdiction to resolve disputes in relation to the 
                                                
62 Article 12(1), Rome Statute.  
63 As per Judge Jessup, ‘‘International law, not being a formalistic system, holds States legally bound by their 
undertakings in a variety of circumstances.’, Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup, South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. 
South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962: I.C. J. Report; 1962, 
p. 319, p.411. 
64 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Consent to Be Bound -Anything New under the Sun?’ (2005) 74 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 483, 484. 
65 Situation in Uganda, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application that the Pre-Trial Chamber Disregard as irrelevant the 
Submission Filed by the Registry on 5 December 2005, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 Mar.2006, paras.22-23; Prosecutor v 
Kony et al., Decision of Admissibility of the Case under Article 19(1) of the statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/04-
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exercise of its jurisdiction,66 or judicial function,67 with regard to the crime of aggression.68 From 
an international institutional law perspective, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the ICC is indicative of 
the separate competences of the ASP and the Court.  In the context of the crime of aggression, 
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the Court to satisfy itself of its interpretation of Articles 15 bis and 15 
ter is indicative of its judicial independence from the ASP.69 
 
3.2. The general rule of means of treaty interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties  
 
The preceding analysis has put forward that the ASP in Kampala tacitly amended Article 121 
of the Rome Statute. Accordingly, the jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression in a case 
of State referrals and proprio motu investigations is premised on the tacit consent/opt-out regime 
pursuant to Article 15 bis(4). Yet, it is for the Court, as the interpreter, to interpret the Rome 
Statute with regard to the provisions on the crime of aggression. Article 31 of the VCLT, is the 
general rule of interpretation, which stipulates, in paragraph 1:  
 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
‘Context’ according to paragraph 2, for the purposes of interpretation of a treaty, comprises [in 
addition to the text]:   
 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;  
 
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty. 
 
                                                
01/05-37710. Mar.2009, para.45; Prosecutor v Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute 
on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 Jun.2009, ICC-01/05-
01/08-424, para.23.    
66 Articles 19, Rome Statute.    
67 Article 119(1), Rome Statute. This was affirmed by the ICJ in Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1974, p. 253, para.23.  
68 Zimmermann (n 9) 226. 
69 OP3 of the New York Activation Decision reaffirmed paragraph 1 of article 40 and paragraph 1 of article 119 of the 
Rome Statute in relation to the judicial independence of the judges of the Court.   
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Resolution RC/Res.6 comprises: amendments on the crime of aggression; Elements of the 
Crime and Understandings. It is likely that this Resolution will be considered together with the 
Rome Statute. Thus, the ambiguity with respect to Article 15 bis(4) and Article 121(5) will arise.  
The New York Activation Decision is a decision adopted within the framework of a Conference 
of States Parties,70 which attempts to provide meaning to Articles 15 bis(4) and Article 121(5) of 
the Rome Statute.71 The apposite question is whether the New York Activation Decision will also 
be considered as part of the ‘context’ in Article 31(2); or ‘to be taken into account together with 
context’ pursuant to Article 31(3) of the VCLT:  
 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions;  
 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation. 
  
In the event that the New York Activation Decision does not fall under Article 31(2) or 
31(3)(a), there is also the possibility that the Decision may amount to subsequent practice as a 
supplementary means of interpretation pursuant to Article 32 of the VCLT.72 Yet, even though 
States Parties acted in their capacity as States Parties to a multilateral treaty, the decision was also 
adopted by the ASP as the plenary organ of the ICC. Thus, the New York Activation Decision 
may be considered as a “Rule of the Organization”.73         
 
3.3. The New York Activation Decision as a subsequent agreement on interpretation 
 
The key features of the New York Activation Decision are the operative paragraphs that decide 
to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as of 17 July 2018;74 and confirm the 
narrow position in relation to the interpretation of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression.75 The latter, i.e. Operative Paragraph 2 (“OP2”) is worth producing in full:  
 
                                                
70 Draft Conclusion 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, ILC Conclusions.  
71 Preamble paragraph 5, Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5 (2017).  
72 Draft Conclusion 4, paragraph 3, and Draft Conclusion 12, paragraph 1, ILC Conclusions  
73 Christiane Ahlborn, ‘The Rules of International Organizations and the Law of International Responsibility’ (2011) 
8 International Organizations Law Review 397, 424–428. 
74 Operative paragraph 1, Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5. 
75 Operative paragraph 2, Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5. 
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[The ASP] Confirms that, in accordance with the Rome Statute, the amendments to the Statute 
regarding the crime of aggression adopted at the Kampala Review Conference enter into force 
for those States Parties which have accepted the amendments one year after the deposit of 
their instruments of ratification or acceptance and that in the case of a State referral or proprio 
motu investigation the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression 
when committed by a national or on the territory of a State Party that has not ratified or 
accepted these amendments. 
 
OP2 appears to reflect Article 121(5) in its entirety, and is consistent with the narrower position 
of interpretation whereby the second sentence of Article 121(5) prevails over Article 15 bis(4) with 
regard to the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression in a case of State referral or 
proprio motu investigation. Thus, it would appear the New York Activation Decision upholds the 
amendment process in Article 121 of the Rome Statute.76   
The legal effect of this decision, may ‘embody, explicitly or implicitly’,77 a ‘subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions’ pursuant to Article 31(3)(a) VCLT. It is important to note that the present inquiry 
differs from the one above in section 2.3. with regard to tacit amendment by States Parties, as it is 
generally ‘presumed that the parties to a treaty, by an agreement or a practice in the application of 
the treaty, intend to interpret the treaty, not to amend or to modify it.’78  
According to the ILC in its Conclusions, in the event that the New York Activation Decision 
amounts to a subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a), OP 2 may be considered as an authentic 
means of interpretation.79 The underlying question is whether the New York Activation Decision 
‘expresses agreement in substance between the parties regarding the interpretation of a 
treaty.’80With the emphasis on the substance of the agreement, the form and procedure by which 
the decision was reached is of lesser significance, ‘including adoption by consensus.’81 In this light, 
                                                
76 Zimmermann (n 17) 20–21. 
77 Draft Conclusion 11, paragraph 2, ILC Conclusions.  
78 Draft Conclusion 7, paragraph 3, ILC Conclusions.  
79 Draft Conclusion 3, ILC Conclusions; See also, Draft Conclusion 2, paragraph 5, and Draft Conclusion 10, 
paragraph 1.; Note that The ILC  has commented that ‘the characterization of subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice of the parties under article 31, paragraph 3(a) and (b), as “authentic means of interpretation” does not, 
however, imply that these means necessarily possess a conclusive effect.[…] For this reason, and notwithstanding the 
suggestions of some commentators, subsequent agreements and subsequent practice that establish the agreement of 
the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty are not necessarily legally binding.’, Commentary to ILC 
Conclusions, p.24, para.4.  
80 Draft Conclusion 11, paragraph 3, ILC Conclusions. 
81 Draft Conclusion 11, paragraph 3, ILC Conclusions.; The ICJ has nevertheless observed in relation to consensus, 
that the Recommendations made by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which take the form of 
resolutions, ‘which take the form of resolutions, are not binding. However, when they are adopted by consensus or 
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the ILC has commented that ‘consensus is not a concept that necessarily indicates any particular 
degree of agreement on substance;’82and that ‘it follows that adoption by consensus is not a 
sufficient condition for an agreement under article 31, paragraph (3)(a) or (b) to be established.’83 
Thus, according to the ILC Conclusions, consensus is not an automatic premise that New York 
Activation Decision amounts to a subsequent agreement. Instead, the underlying factor is whether 
all States Parties have agreed in substance to the interpretation of the Rome Statute as stipulated 
in OP2.84 However, it is difficult to say with certainty that all States Parties agreed substantively on 
the interpretation stipulated in OP2, and that the latter demonstrates ‘objective evidence of the 
understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty’ as an authentic means of 
interpretation.85 
Prior to the ASP Session in New York, States Parties had submitted papers expressing 
different views with regard to the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression.86 At the 
ASP session itself, an option was for States Parties to simply decide to activate the Court’s 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.87 Accordingly, the Court would satisfy itself of its 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, thereby resolving the dispute between States Parties. Yet, 
Kress informs that ‘many of those States Parties supporting the “restrictive position” did not wish 
to take the risk that the Court might, after the activation of its jurisdiction, decide not to follow 
their view. They rather sought to have their position accepted and confirmed by all States Parties 
                                                
by a unanimous vote, they may be relevant for the interpretation of the Convention or its Schedule.’ Whaling in the 
Antarctic (Australia v Japan, New Zealand Intervening), Judgment 31 March 2014, ICJ Reports (2014), 226, at para.46.  
82 Commentary to draft Conclusion 11, paragraph 3, p.90, para.30. 
83 Commentary to draft Conclusion 11, paragraph 3, p.91, para.31.  
See also Comments on Some Procedural Questions issued by the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat in accordance with General Assembly resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006, paper prepared by the 
Secretariat; as reproduced in Commentary to draft Conclusion 11, para.3, at p.91.   
84 Commentary to draft Conclusion 11, paragraph.3, p.92, para.38. 
85 draft Conclusion 3, ILC Conclusions.  
86 For the narrower position, see Paper submitted by Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Norway and United Kingdom 
(March 2017) on Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the crime of aggression amendments adopted 
in Kampala, Report on the Facilitation on the Activation of the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over 
the crime of aggression (ICC-ASP/16/24) 27 November 2017 (hereinafter “Report on the facilitation of activation”), 
Annex II, p.15, para.2 (‘It is our clear view that as a matter of treaty law, and contrary to an opinion which has been 
expressed, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over nationals of a State or on the territory of a State unless that 
State accepts or ratifies the aggression amendments. It is essential that this point is clarified before any decision is 
taken to activate the crime of aggression’); For the broader position, see Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 
2017), Report on the facilitation of activation, Annex II, p.21-22, paras.9-14; and Paper submitted by Argentina, 
Botswana, Samoa, Slovenia and Switzerland (August 2017), Report on the facilitation of activation, Annex II, p.25 
(‘The only remaining action the Kampala Review Conference gave the ASP to consider is “turning the light on”. 
Adopting an operative paragraph according to which the ASP ‘decides to activate the jurisdiction of the ICC over the 
crime of aggression’ is all that is necessary.’). 
87 See Operative paragraph 1 of Elements of an activation decision, presented by Switzerland, ,Report on the 
facilitation on the activation, Annex III, ICC-ASP/16/24; see also Nikolas Stürchler, ‘‘The Activation of the Crime 
of Aggression in Perspective’, available online at )https:// www.ejiltalk.org/the-activation-of-the-crime-of-aggression-
in-perspective/), and Kress (n 14) 9–10; Clark, ‘Exercise of Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression (International 
Criminal Court)’ (n 10) para.44.       
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as part of the resolution accompanying the activation decision.’88 Thus, another option was a bridge 
of sorts between both positions that allowed ‘both campus to maintain their respective legal 
positions and of providing any State Party that supported the “restrictive position”,  if it so desired, 
with a legal avenue for jurisdictional protection in the event that the Court were to embrace the 
more “permissive position.”’89   
Kress further points out that the UK and France were adamant that ‘all States Parties should 
accept the “restrictive position as part of the ASP resolution accompanying the activation 
decision.’90 This created an  ‘extremely difficult situation’,91 as a vote in lieu of consensus brought 
forth uncertainty with regard to whether the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression would 
be activated.92 Although adoption by vote was technically possible in light of Article 15 bis(3) and 
15 ter(3) calling for a two-third majority, it would appear that decision-making by consensus was 
the sounder political choice.93 Yet, to obtain a consensus in light of the adamancy of France and 
UK to include a provision accompanying the provision activating the jurisdiction, States Parties 
holding onto the broader position had to make significant concessions in this regard.94  
Thus, the consensus for the New York Activation Decision is not necessarily representative 
of States Parties agreeing with the position in OP2; but rather States Parties who held the opposing 
position did not wish to block the consensus.95 Furthermore, upon the adoption of the New York 
Activation Decision, certain States Parties had expressed their legal positions which affirmed their 
views in relation to the broader position – and not, as stipulated in OP2.96 So, it would seem in 
light of the ILC Conclusions, the differing positions by the States Parties and the explanation after 
                                                
88 Kress (n 14) 10. 
89 ibid. Kress elaborates that one proposed variant was ‘to have all States Parties agree that the communication by a 
State Party of its “restrictive position” to the Registrar should be treated by the Court as a declaration, as referred to 
in Article 15 bis(4) of the ICC statute, if the Court were to embrace the ‘more permissive position’’, which was a draft 
transmitted by Germany to the Austrian Facilitator, and occasionally referred to as the ‘Non-German Non-Paper’; the 
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realities of multilateral negotiations, the outcome would very likely have been eternal postponement. After all these 
years, the crime of aggression would have failed to overcome a last final hurdle.’ Stürchler,(n 87 ); see also ibid. 
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the adoption of the New York Activation Decision of their positions contrary to the one in OP2 
would suggest that there was no agreement in substance by all of the States Parties.97  
That said, the contrary positions by States Parties were expressed prior to and after the 
adoption of the Amendments, and not during the moment of the adoption of the Resolution by 
consensus. Furthermore, although decision-making by consensus it not necessarily always legally 
binding;98 in the present context, the New York Activation Decision is legally binding.99 Thus,  
adoption by consensus, is indicative of acquiescence by disagreeing States, which has the legal 
effect of creating an agreement between States Parties regarding the interpretation of the Rome 
Statute.100   
 It has been acknowledged that not all States Parties were present at the moment of the 
adoption of the New York Activation Decision.101As such, it has been questioned whether the 
New York Activation Decision may be a subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a).102 The 
premise appears to question whether tacit acceptance by non-present States Parties is sufficient 
for the purposes of ascertaining ‘objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the 
meaning of the treaty’ as an authentic means of interpretation.103 Be that as it may, the will of the 
States Parties present at ASP was to adopt by consensus, a resolution for the interpretation of its 
constituent instrument. With regard to States Parties who were not present at the ASP, an 
argument can be made that these States had entrusted the performance of the decision to activate 
the ICC’s jurisdiction to the plenary organ of the ICC.104 The New York Activation Decision, was 
thus the result of a binding decision adopted by the Plenary Organ of the ICC, which ‘may have 
contractual effects at the level of treaty interpretation.’105 The present inquiry turns to Draft 
Conclusion 12, paragraph 2, which stipulates that subsequent agreements […] under article 31(3) 
[…] ‘may arise from, or be expressed in, the practice of an international organization in the 
application of its constituent instrument.’ Thus, it is submitted that the New York Activation 
Decision is a subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a), which may be a means of interpretation 
for the Rome Statute.   
                                                
97 Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 946. 
98 Schermers and Blokker (n 4) 561. 
99 OP1: Decides to activate[…].  
100 The ICJ has observed that in relation to non-binding resolutions, adoption by consensus nonetheless carries weight, 
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan, New Zealand Intervening), Judgment 31 March 2014, ICJ Reports (2014), 
226, at para.46 (‘However, when they are adopted by consensus or by a unanimous vote, they may be relevant for the 
interpretation of the Convention or its Schedule.’) 
101 Stürchler (n  87 ); Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 946.; Zimmermann contemplates the position of non-present 
States Parties, at Zimmermann (n 17) 25.  
102 Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 946. See also Jon Kevin Heller, ‘The Uncertain Legal Status of the Aggression 
Understandings’’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 229, 237–239. 
103 draft Conclusion 3, ILC Conclusions.  
104 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 281. 
105 Ahlborn (n 74) 427. 
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 According to the law of treaties, the starting point is Article 31(1), which will interpret Articles 
12, 15 bis(4) and 121(5) of the Rome Statute in ‘good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given’ in their ‘context’, which shall comprise Resolution RC/Res.6, and ‘to be taken into 
account, together with the context’, the New York Activation Decision which amounts to a 
subsequent agreement under Article 31(3). Thus, OP2 may contribute to clarifying the meaning of 
Article 15 bis(4),106 which may result in ‘narrowing’ the interpretation of the jurisdictional regime 
of the ICC over this crime.107 This would mean that the Kampala Amendments enter into force in 
accordance with the Rome Statute – and not the tacitly amended amendment regime adopted in 
Kampala. Accordingly, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in the event 
of State referrals and proprio motu investigations only if both the intended aggressed State and the 
alleged aggressor State have ratified the amendments.  
However, there is also the possibility that the New York Activation Decision, even as a 
subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a) may not serve any clarification as the ILC has also 
commented that ‘the interpreter must give appropriate weight to such an interpretive resolution 
under article 31(paragraph 3(a) and (b), but not necessarily treat it as legally binding.’108 Thus, it is 
for the interpreter to decide that the New York Activation Decision is a subsequent agreement 
under Article 31(3)(a), and the appropriate weight to this interpretive instrument accordingly.  
In the event that the interpreter is not satisfied that the New York Activation Decision is a 
subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a), it may nevertheless be considered as subsequent 
practice according to Article 32 of VCLT. 109 The recent ILC Conclusions has stipulated in 
Conclusion 4, para.3 that:  
 
A subsequent practice as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 consists of 
conduct by one or more parties in the application of the treaty, after its conclusion.110 
 
This is perhaps most likely if the interpreter is not satisfied, possibly in reliance on the 
framework of the ILC Conclusions, that the New York Activation Decision did not constitute an 
                                                
106 draft Conclusion 7, paragraph 1, ILC Conclusions.  
107 Commentary to draft Conclusion 7, paragraph 1, Commentary to ILC Conclusions, p.52, para.7.  
108 Commentary to draft Conclusion 11, p.93, para.37.  
109 Draft Conclusion 2, paragraph 1, ILC Conclusions (‘Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties set forth, respectively, the general rule of interpretation and the recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation. These rules also apply as customary international law.’) 
110 In the Commentary to Draft Conclusion 4, paragraph 3, it is stated ‘any practice in the application of the treaty 
that may provide indications as to how the treaty is to be interpreted may be a relevant supplementary means of 
interpretation under article 32,’ Conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the 
interpretation of treaties, with commentaries 2018, A/73/10 (hereinafter “Commentary to ILC Conclusions”), 
p.33,para.24.   
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agreement between States Parties on the interpretation as stipulated in OP2. According to the ILC, 
under Article 32, ‘“this form of subsequent practice, […] does not require the agreement of all 
parties.’111 Although subsequent practice under article 32 does not establish the agreement of the 
parties unlike subsequent practice under article 31, it nevertheless also contributes to the 
clarification of the meaning of a treaty.112 Furthermore, Article 31 as the general rule of 
interpretation, and article 32 as recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, must be read 
together as they are rules of customary international law,113 and ‘constitute an integrated framework 
for the interpretation of treaties.’114  
Accordingly, if the New York Activation Decision is a subsequent practice under Article 32(2) 
VCLT, OP2 may be used to confirm the meaning of the Rome Statute in accordance with Article 
31.115 Yet, the ICC has the discretion whether to take into account supplementary means of 
interpretation as Article 32 stipulates ‘recourse may be had’, in contrast to ‘shall’ under Article 31 
with regard to the general rule of interpretation. Furthermore, supplementary means of 
interpretation under Article 32 comprises ‘preparatory work of the treaty’ in addition to 
‘circumstances of its conclusion’. Thus, in accordance with Article 32, the Court would thus have 
recourse to consider preparatory works from Rome to Kampala to New York, as well as the New 
York Activation Decision as subsequent practice, to confirm the meaning of Articles 15 bis(4) and 
Article 121 of the Rome Statute pursuant to Article 31 of the VCLT. In this light, the negotiation 
history from Rome to Kampala is more consistent with the position of States Parties that espouse 
the jurisdictional regime of the ICC is premised on tacit consent/opt-out, i.e. the broader position. 
That said, the New York Activation Decision, had ‘arisen’ from or was ‘expressed’ in the practice 
of the ASP as an organ of the ICC in the application of its constituent instrument.116 Thus, the 
text of OP2 may be particularly instructive in confirming the narrow position on jurisdiction: i.e., 
the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression if both the intended aggressed 
State and alleged aggressor State have ratified.  
Ultimately, it is for the interpreter to decide whether the New York Activation Decision is a 
subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT or subsequent practice under Article 
32. Also, as mentioned above, the characterization of the New York Activation Decision as a 
                                                
111 Commentary to draft Conclusion 4, paragraph 3, at p.33, para.23; see also Commentary to draft conclusion 4, 
paragraph 2, at 31, para.16. 
112 Draft Conclusion 7, paragraph 3, ILC Conclusions. 
113 Draft Conclusion 2, paragraph 1, ILC Conclusions; for practice of courts and tribunals that have acknowledged 
the customary character of these rules, see Commentary to draft Conclusion 2, paragraph 1, at p.18-19, para.4.   
114 Commentary to draft Conclusion 2, paragraph 1, at p.17, para.3.  
115 Akande and Tzanakopoulos (n 12) 948–949. 
116 Draft Conclusion 12, paragraph 2.  
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subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a) would not necessarily be legally binding,117or 
‘necessarily conclusive in the sense that it overrides all other means of interpretation.’118  
 
3.4. The New York Activation Decision as a rule of the organization  
 
The Rome Statute is a constituent instrument of an international organization, to which the 
VCLT and law of treaties applies.119 Constituent instruments are multilateral treaties that are 
special in nature.120 The ICJ said in the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict Advisory opinion:  
 
But the constituent instruments of international organizations are also treaties of a 
particular type; their object is to create new subjects of law endowed with a certain 
autonomy, to which the parties entrust the task of realizing common goals. Such treaties 
can raise specific problems of interpretation owing, inter alia, to their character which is 
conventional and at the same time institutional; the very nature of the organization created, 
the objectives which have been assigned to it by its founders, the imperatives associated 
with the effective performance of its functions, as well as its own practice, are all elements 
which may deserve special attention when the time comes to interpret these constituent 
treaties.121  
 
Draft Conclusion 12 of the ILC Conclusions confirms that rules on treaty interpretation are 
applicable to the constituent instruments of international organizations. In particular, it provides   
guidance with regard to the way in which subsequent agreements shall be taken into account in 
the interpretation of the constituent treaty in accordance with Articles 31 and 32. Paragraph 1, 
affirms that subsequent agreements under Article 31(3) and subsequent practice under Article 32 
may be a means of interpretation for the constituent instrument in accordance with Articles 31 
and 32. As discussed above, pursuant to Draft Conclusion, paragraph 2, the New York Activation 
Decision may be considered as a subsequent agreement that may arise from, or be expressed, in 
the practice of the plenary organ of the ICC in the application of its constituent instrument.  
                                                
117 Commentary to draft conclusion 3, p.24-25, para.4.  
118 Commentary to draft conclusion 3, p.25, para.4.  
119 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.66, 
para.19.   
120 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.Reports 
1962, p.151, 157; Schermers and Blokker (n 4) 759. 
121 I. C. J. Reports 1996, p. 66, para.19. see also Ahlborn (n 74) 425. 
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The problem with the argument that the New York Activation Decision may be considered 
as a subsequent agreement or practice under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is that not all 
States Parties were present at the ASP. In this regard, it is significant that the Rome Statute is the 
constituent instrument of the ICC. It has a dual nature as a contract and a constitution, which 
gives rise to new rules that might not have been foreseen in the original founding treaty and were 
not brought about by a formal treaty amendment procedure.122 It is for this reason that the ICJ 
referred to the constituent instruments of international organizations as “treaties of a particular 
type’. 
Indeed, while Conclusion 12 of the ILC Conclusions affirms the applicability of Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention to the constituent instruments of international organizations, it also 
includes an important caveat. As stated, in paragraph 4: “Paragraphs 1 to 3 apply to the 
interpretation of any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization 
without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization. This wording reflects Article 5 VCLT, 
which stipulates that the rules in the VCLT are ‘without prejudice to any relevant rules of the 
organization.’123 The ‘rules of the organization’ were defined in the Article 2(b) of the ILC Draft 
Articles on the responsibility of international organization 2011: This reflects Article 5 VCLT, 
which stipulates that the rules in the VCLT are ‘without prejudice to any relevant rules of the 
organization.’124 The ‘rules of the organization’ were defined in the Article 2(b) of the ILC Draft 
Articles on the responsibility of international organization 2011: “rules of the organization” means, 
in particular, the constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions and other acts of the international 
organization adopted in accordance with those instruments, and established practice of the 
organization.”  
While the characterization of the New York Activation Decision as a subsequent agreement 
or subsequent practice amongst the parties to the Rome Statute may be questions, the decision is 
clearly a rule of the organization, taken by one of its organs: the ASP. As is well known, 
international organizations may have different modes of decision-making and for the entry into 
force of those decisions.125 It may not be required that all member states participate in the decision-
making, or vote in favor of a particular decision, for it to become effective. This stands in notable 
contrast to the entry into force of a treaty, which requires the explicit consent to be bound by the 
                                                
122 ibid 403; Schermers and Blokker (n 4) 876.  
123 Gardiner (n 105) 281. 
124 ibid. 
125 Schermers and Blokker (n 4) 783–784. 
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treaty.126 In the same vein, the “established practice” of an organization, as part of the rules of the 
organization can be distinguished from subsequent practice under the Vienna Convention.127 
The question is whether the New York Activation Decision itself may constitute a “relevant 
rule” of interpretation with regard to the Rome Statute. As such, the New York Activation 
Decision may take precedence over the general rules of interpretation in Article 31 and 32 
VCLT,128 particularly when the interpreter is an organ of the International Organization, i.e. the 
Appeals Division; Trial Division and Pre-Trial Division.129 It is likely that the organ of the ICC 
that interprets the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression would rely on the OP2 of the New 
York Activation Decision as a clause or “relevant rule” regarding the jurisdictional regime of the 
ICC in the event of State referrals and proprio motu investigations. By comparison, an interpreter 
who is not an organ of the ICC, e.g. the ICJ, would rely on the law of treaties and not the rules of 
the organization. Accordingly, as the Rome Statute and the Kampala Amendments are not easily 
reconcilable, the New York Activation Decision will likely be referred to as a subsequent 
agreement under Article 31(3)(a) to confirm the meaning of the relevant terms of the Rome Statute 
in accordance with the general rule of interpretation in Article 31.  
Even if the New York Activation Decision is characterized as a “rule of the organization”, it 
must be emphasized that the decision itself reaffirms the regular amendment procedure under the 
Rome Statute, which requires the ratification of the Kampala Amendments by a state for the ICC 
to have jurisdiction over that state in relation to the crime of aggression. In that sense, the New 
York Activation decision reconciles the inconsistences between former Article 5 (2) of the Rome 
Statute and Article 15 bis (4) of the Kampala Amendments under both the law of treaties and 
international institutional law.  
 
4. Settlement of disputes   
 
The starting point for reflecting upon settlement of disputes is that the Rome Statute is an 
international treaty, and therefore general rules on settlement of international disputes are 
applicable to it. The earlier analysis has identified discreet issues of interpretation of the Rome 
Statute that, if unresolved, constitute disputes between its States Parties with regard to the 
jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the crime of aggression both in the case of State referrals and 
                                                
126 Article 24, VCLT.  
127 Ahlborn submits that ‘[w]hile the principle of subsequent practice in the law of treaties is based on the premise 
that all parties to the treaty participate in its reinterpretation, institutional practice may often include only a fraction of 
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128 Commentary to Draft Conclusion 12, paragraph 4, at p.104, para.39.  
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proprio motu investigations by the ICC Prosecutor. It is a trite point that disputes relating to the 
Rome Statute, including disputes relating to its interpretation, have to be settled in accordance 
with international law, just as any other disputes regarding international treaties. A slight wrinkle 
to the application of general principles of international dispute settlement is provided by the 
perhaps slightly unusual interplay between the general rules and the mechanisms provided for in 
the instrument itself.  
International legal order is highly flexible regarding the choice of dispute settlement means 
and mechanisms, and particularly deferential to choices of parties. An authoritative expression of 
this general systemic preference, articulated with an eye to international peace and security and 
therefore particularly relevant for the topic under discussion, is Article 33(1) of the UN Charter, 
which provides that:  
 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
 
States Parties thus have a variety of means for the peaceful settlement of their disputes pertaining 
to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression as Article 33(1) is not exhaustive and explicitly 
provides States with the option of ‘other peaceful means of their own choice’. The implication of 
the language of ‘choice’ used by the UN Charter is that all formalized dispute settlement 
mechanisms require an opt-in in the form of consent to be operational: in the words of the PCIJ 
that still reflect positive law on the issue, ‘no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit 
its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific 
settlement.’130 Consequently, the available mechanisms of dispute settlement will be provided by 
a combination of mechanisms to which States are generally subject and that cover disputes about 
the Rome Statute, and the special regime provided by the Rome Statute for dispute settlement 
between States Parties. The somewhat atypical Article 119 of the Rome Statute is worth quoting 
in full: 
 
1. Any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled by the decision 
of the Court.  
                                                
130 Status of the Eastern Carelia (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ Ser B, 1923, No.5, p.27, and more recently Immunities and 
Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v France) (Preliminary Objections) [2018] ICJ Rep para. 42.   
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2. Any other dispute between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or 
application of this Statute which is not settled through negotiations within three months of 
their commencement shall be referred to the Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly may 
itself seek to settle the dispute or may make recommendations on further means of settlement 
of the dispute, including referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the 
Statute of that Court.  
 
Two separate mechanisms for dispute settlement exist within the framework of the Rome 
Statute, each expressed in a separate paragraph, 131 The scope of both paragraphs is set by the 
concept of ‘a dispute’, which is not given a special meaning and can therefore be taken to refer to 
its ordinary meaning in international law of dispute settlement. The most recent contemporary 
elaboration of the concept was provided by the International Court of Justice in the trio of cases 
regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament, where the ICJ both confirmed the classic definition of a dispute,132 and applied in a 
rather stringent manner, calling for a clear opposition of views between particular parties regarding 
legal issues (and general statements in a multilateral context would not suffice).133 The distinction 
between disputes subject to the first and the second paragraph are drawn by reference to ‘the 
judicial function of the Court’: a dispute pertaining to this class of affairs falls under the first 
paragraph, while ‘[a]ny other dispute … relating to the interpretation or application’ of the Rome 
Statute falls under the second paragraph. Interpretation of the scope of ‘judicial function’ is 
therefore a key element in determining the operation of dispute settlement mechanisms.  
The Rome Statute does not provide a special meaning or a technical definition for the ‘judicial 
function’, nor do the Rules of Procedure.134 The terms are also used in the Rome Statute in relation 
to the role of Chambers,135 and independence of judges136 but not in a manner that can provide 
helpful context for interpreting Article 119(1). It therefore seems that the ordinary meaning of 
‘judicial function’ in international law of international courts and tribunals must be applied here. 
Accordingly, ‘judicial function’ does not appear to have a set technical meaning but rather reflects 
                                                
131 Alain Pellet, ‘Settlement of Disputes’, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol II (Oxford 
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132 Case concerning East Timor – para.99; Case of Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J., Ser.A, 
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the structural and functional peculiarities of particular institutions, and indeed its very scope and 
purpose may be subject to disagreement. For example, the International Court of Justice has in its 
recent practice noted that its judicial function is protected by the principle of res judicata,137 in 
contentious cases is to decide disputes,138 that an element of its judicial function is that its 
judgments have practical consequences, and that its exercise is not precluded by negotiations,139 
and its President noted separately that the judicial function is satisfied by rejecting the relief 
requested not sufficiently founded in law.140 And, of course, judicial function in international law 
is a subject of rich and diverse scholarly discussion. 141 Taking all of those points together, it seems 
that ‘judicial function’ may be read as including those decisions necessarily taken in the normal 
exercise of judicial activities, and would at a minimum include decisions on jurisdiction, 
admissibility, and applicable law, definition of crimes and their application to factual 
circumstances, and decisions on co-operation with the Court.142 The ‘settled’ aspect of the 
provision refers to Article 150(2) of the Statute, according to which the final decision of the 
Appeals Chamber is final and binding on the parties.  
It is worth noting a somewhat curious aspect of OP3 of the New York Activation Decision, 
namely that it reaffirmed Article 119(1) in light of judicial independence of the judges of the Court, 
even though it relates to judicial function, which may entail impartiality of judges but, as suggested 
above, is certainly broader in scope. Be that as it may, a dispute pertaining to the judicial function 
of the Court is most likely to entail questions of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. If an 
alleged aggressor State Party disagrees with the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a crime of 
aggression, this would be a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 19 (Article 
19(2)(c) may be particularly relevant as it allows a State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is 
required under article 12 to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court). It would also be, if the reading 
of ‘judicial function’ suggested above is accepted, a challenge falling under Article 191(1) and 
therefore capable of being pursued to the extent that the Rome Statute’s procedure permits, 
                                                
137 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical 
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Settlement of Disputes’ in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
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namely to the Appeals Chamber. Does the language of ‘settled’ affect rights that States would 
otherwise have to access dispute settlement mechanisms agreed upon elsewhere, e.g. under the 
Optional Clause of the ICJ? Judicial authority has somewhat differed in its emphasis on interaction 
of various international tribunals where the other tribunal is not explicitly excluded,143 but in this 
instance it is plausible to treat ‘settled’ as language excluding other mechanisms, if not explicitly 
then by necessary implication. It may be helpful to distinguish the effect of Article 191(1) on the 
State Party that resorts to another mechanism – a breach of its obligations seems likely – and its 
effects on that mechanism.  In practice, the effect of Article 191(1) will turn on the willingness of 
the other court or tribunal to desist from proceeding due to the State’s (or States’) consent to 
Article 191(1), and much will turn on that tribunal perception of its judicial function and whether 
it permits waivers or qualifications of judicial access in such a manner. An even harder question is 
whether, in the event of a Security Council referral, where the ICC exercises jurisdiction over the 
national of a non-State Party for an act of aggression it has allegedly committed, the effect of 
Article 119(1) is to preclude the non-State Party from raising a dispute in relation to the judicial 
function of the ICC in this regard in a different forum of its choice; e.g., if the non-State Party 
concerned is involved with another State in a contentious case before the ICJ where the judicial 
function of the ICC will be considered. Much would depend on the language that the Security 
Council uses in the referral, and the extent to which this provision of the Rome Statute is treated 
as directly applicable or substantively replicated by the relevant resolution.   
As noted above, there may be reasonable disagreement over whether ‘judicial function’ covers 
all aspects of disputes about aggression. If the particular dispute does not fall under Article 119(1), 
it will be covered by Article 119(2). The dispute between States Parties with regard to the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression may exist separately, as well as in 
parallel, with a dispute over the judicial function of the Court. Thus, irrespective of the initiation 
or commencement of any proceedings on the crime of aggression at the ICC, a disagreement 
between one or two more States Parties with regard to the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction over 
the crime may wish to settle their disputes in accordance with Article 119(2), provided that the 
dispute between States Parties falls within the meaning of ‘interpretation or application’ of the 
Rome Statute.144  
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Article 119(2) provides for two mechanisms. The first mechanism comprises bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations between States Parties.145 The ICJ held in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases that parties concerned are ‘under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the 
negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own 
position without contemplating any modification to it.’146 It is unclear whether the concerned 
Parties or the ASP are to decide whether the ‘dispute cannot be settled by diplomatic 
negotiation,’147 and thus refer the dispute to the ASP. Be that as it may, the ASP as the second 
mechanism for dispute settlement, will have to satisfy itself that negotiations had taken place for 
three months,148 and were unsuccessful;149 upon which, it may either seek to settle the dispute 
itself, or make recommendations on further means of settlement, which also includes a referral to 
the ICJ.  
For the ASP to settle the dispute itself, Article 121(2)(g) of the Rome Statute provides the 
ASP with the power to perform any function consistent with this Statute, which in present context 
is to settle the dispute between States Parties. The ASP also has the power to create subsidiary 
bodies (organs) as may be necessary.150 It is not clear whether decisions by the ASP or intended 
subsidiary organs pertaining to the dispute will be legally binding on States Parties, and there is 
something to be said for taking the nemo dat quod non habet position on the ability of institutions to 
create agents that have more powers than their principals.151 In any event, ‘recommendations on 
further means of settlement’ made by the ASP will not be binding on States Parties, as they have 
the freedom of choice with regard to the means of dispute settlement and may choose to not 
comply with the recommendations.152 Furthermore, as States Parties must consent to any form of 
dispute settlement, they are under no obligation to settle their disputes. Thus, Article 119(2) does 
not preclude the general regime pursuant to Article 33(1) of the UN Charter.153    
It is also not clear whether recommendations by the ASP encompassing a referral to the ICJ 
relates to a contentious proceeding or an advisory proceeding. The former may make more sense 
than the latter in the context of settling a dispute between two (or more) States Parties; yet, with 
regard to contentious proceedings, contesting States Parties are under no obligation to follow this 
                                                
145 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, UN Doc.S/Res/37/10, para.9.  
146 North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, para.85 
147 Mavromattis Case, PCIJ, Series A, No.2, 1924, p.13.  
148 Clark, ‘Article 119: Settle of Disputes’ (n 143) 2279. 
149 Pellet, ‘Settlement of Disputes’ (n 132) 1845. 
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recommendation.154 Pellet suggests that the ICJ may only exercise jurisdiction in light of such a 
recommendation by the ASP if :  ‘(1) the parties to the dispute sign a special agreement referring 
it to the International Court; or (2) if pre-existing bilateral or multilateral treaty includes a provision 
constituting a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court in conformity with Article 36(1) of its Statute; 
or (3) if the States Parties have both made an optional declaration under Article 36(2) without any 
relevant reservation.’155 Under Article 96(a) of the UN Charter, ‘the General Assembly of the 
Security Council may request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on any legal question’; while 
96(b) stipulates that the General Assembly may authorize other organs of the UN and specialized 
agencies, ‘to request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of 
their activities.’156 As the ICC is neither an organ of the UN or a specialized agency,157 it is 
questionable whether the General Assembly may authorize the Court to request an advisory 
opinion of the ICJ.158 Much would depend on the way how the request is drafted, and the African 
Union’s possible request of an advisory opinion regarding immunities of heads of State is likely to 
provide practical guidance: it is plausible to expect that both constitutionally and politically the 
GA would be more inclined to request an opinion on a general legal issue rather than invite the 
ICJ to act as a de facto review authority. 159 Indeed, the more that resort to the ICJ or another 
international tribunal approaches review of ICC’s decisions, the stronger the argument that the 
‘judicial function’ criterion in Article 119(1) is triggered, and the decision in question must be 
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5. Concluding Remarks   
 
The enquiry above has shown that States Parties in Kampala had tacitly amended the Rome 
Statute with regard to Article 121, the article governing amendments. Thus, pursuant to Resolution 
RC/Res.6, the Kampala Amendments enter into force in accordance with the first sentence of 
Article 121(5) of the Rome Statute so as to give legal effect to Article 15 bis(4) with regard to the 
jurisdiction of the  ICC over the crime of aggression in the event of State referrals and proprio motu 
investigations. This had led to ambiguity with respect to whether the amendments on the crime of 
aggression, including the provisions stipulating the exercise of jurisdiction, should enter into force 
in accordance with the Rome Statute or the Kampala Amendments. The answer is that the tacit 
amendment by States Parties gives effect to the latter. Thus, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression as long as either the intended aggressed State or the alleged aggressor State 
have ratified the Kampala Amendments. The jurisdictional scope of the ICC in the event of State 
referrals and proprio motu investigations is thus premised on a tacit consent/opt-out one.    
However, the New York Activation Decision appears to hold that Article 121(5) should be 
read in accordance with the Rome Statute and not the Kampala Amendments. The interpreter is 
likely to view the New York Activation Decision as a subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a) 
of the VCLT as an authentic means of interpretation of the Rome Statute in accordance with 
Article 31(1). In the event that the interpreter is an organ of the ICC, the New York Activation 
Decision is a Rule of the International Organization. Thus, the New York Activation Decision 
espouses the narrower position of jurisdiction. The legal and practical effect is that the ICC may 
only exercise jurisdiction over a national for the crime of aggression if both the intended aggressed 
State Party and aggressor State Party have ratified the amendments. 
 Ultimately, the ICC has the Kompetenz-Kompetenz to satisfy itself of the jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, including the scope of this jurisdiction. The Court also has the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz to settle disputes with regard to its judicial function, which may include its interpretation 
of the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression. With regard to disputes that States may have other 
than ‘judicial function’ of the ICC, the ASP may be a mechanism for settlement – but does not 
necessarily preclude other mechanisms of dispute settlement under international law.    
This article has brought to light the interplay between international institutional law, the law 
of treaties and dispute settlement in the contemplation of the activation of the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression. In particular, the questions of amendment and interpretation of the 
Rome Statute, demonstrate the sophistication of constituent instruments of International 
Organization and the freedom afforded to member States to make decisions in Conferences of 
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States Parties. Indeed, it would appear that States have rather extensive freedom under 
international law in this regard. The consideration of dispute settlement mechanisms, both the 
specialist regime in the Rome Statute and the more generalist regime in the international legal 
order, also demonstrates how international legal order also provides freedom to States with regard 
to their choices of dispute settlement means and mechanisms.  
